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Abstract 
This article explores the political dynamics surrounding the Eastern Provincial Council 
during Sri Lanka’s post-war transition. We show that decentralisation constituted an 
intervention in conflict, rather than a solution to it. It creates new institutional arenas to re-
negotiate centre-periphery relations, resulting in new forms of political mobilisation. There 
are crucial spatial dimensions to these contentions: it involves contested territorialisation of 
power, scalar manoeuvring, and boundary drawing. We illustrate how wider tensions 
between deconcentration and devolution play out in Sri Lanka’s Eastern Province, 
highlighting the key role performed by brokers in mediating centre-periphery relations, both 
through and alongside the Provincial Council.  
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1. Introduction 
It was a blistering hot afternoon in Batticaloa, eastern Sri Lanka in mid-2008. Whilst most 
people were taking a post rice and curry siesta in this sleepy coastal town, one of the authors 
(Author A) and his research assistant were trudging through the heat to the ‘kachcheri’ 
(government secretariat) for an interview. The only sounds were the drone of the cicadas and 
a group of schoolboys playing cricket on a dusty patch of grass nearby. Then from the 
distance we heard the wailing of approaching sirens, followed in seconds by a cavalcade of 
vehicles going at great speed. There was barely time to get out of the way and catch a fleeting 
glimpse of two military jeeps escorting a black Land Cruiser with tinted windows. Was this a 
central government dignitary or army general paying a quick visit from Colombo? No, it 
transpired that the cavalcade was escorting a local figure, someone who six years before had 
been an LTTE cadre, fighting in the bush against the Sri Lankan government. His nom de 
guerre was Pillayan (his real name, Sivanesathurai Chandrakanthan) and his fortunes had 
changed dramatically after the 2002 ceasefire. Following a sequence of rebel splits, 
internecine fighting and the government driving the LTTE out of the East, Pillayan was 
elected as Chief Minister of the Eastern Province. He was at the height of his powers when 
we saw him speeding through Batticaloa. But his meteoric rise was to be followed by an 
equally dramatic fall from grace. He lost the 2012 elections, became an embarrassment to the 
government, and was eventually arrested on charges of murder. 
Although Pillayan’s rise and fall was a sudden one, it is not atypical of the shifts in power 
and fortunes that frequently accompany, and are features of, contested post-war transitions. 
His trajectory captures an important dynamic, in which power can oscillate back and forth 
between centre and periphery; the battles for authority, positions and resources can be at their 
most intense and deadly on the margins of the state. Historically in Sri Lanka, violent 
challenges to the state emerged from the periphery, contributing in turn to central 
government’s anxiety about asserting its presence in these zones. In light of this tension, the 
politics around decentralised government has always been a key arena of contestation, which 
is explored below in relation to Sri Lanka’s Provincial Council system. Far from being a 
technical solution to the ‘ethnic problem’ – a means of dispersing power and democratizing 
the state – we argue that local government has been a lightening rod for local, national and 
international sets of interests and insecurities and as a result has added new layers of 
complexity to a protracted conflict. As Pillayan’s career also shows, an analysis that takes for 
granted the binary divisions between the national and local, formal and informal, state and 
non-state is deficient; brokers tend to dissolve or transgress such boundaries and categories, 
exploiting the points of friction between them, so as to direct or filter the flow of power and 
resources. Successful brokers – which Pillayan, in the long term, evidently was not – are able 
to manage and keep in tension contending sets of pressures that emanate from the state at the 
centre and their constituencies in the periphery.  
In section 2, we highlight how a stronger focus on space, territory and brokerage can add to 
and deepen the insights yielded by this research. Section 3 provides some basic background 
on Sri Lanka’s conflict, devolution, and the Eastern Provincial Council. Our empirical 
analysis then consists of two parts. In section 4, we examine the institutional politics of the 
Eastern Provincial Council during the post-war period (2007-2015). In section 5, we provide 
three illustrative accounts of brokers to explore the informal networks of power that 
underpinned and shaped the formal institutions of local government. We finish with a set of 
conclusions and possible areas for future research. 
The empirical analysis draws upon a combination of the authors’ long term experience of 
research in the East since the 1990s (Author A) and 2000s (Authors B and C). Specifically it 
draws upon fieldwork conducted in the East in 2006-2009 (A and B) and 2010-2016 (B), and 
in Colombo in 2012 (A) and 2016 (A and C).  This research involved the systematic tracing 
of key players in East Sri Lanka’s political landscape over time (complemented with key 
informant interviews and observations to capture common perceptions about these players) 
and detailed accounts of key turning points or moments of rupture, including elections, 
military victories and political ruptures. The present article revisits older research material to 
capture longer-term patterns. It article also draws upon secondary historical, political science 
and anthropological literature on the Provincial Council system and political dynamics in the 
Eastern Province. 
 
2. Bringing the margins back in: decentralisation, space and power 
Much of the policy literature on local government and conflict has focused on the basic 
question of whether decentralisation is an effective tool for resolving conflict in divided, 
post-war societies. The debates about constitutional design can broadly be divided into an 
integrationist position, which argues for strong centralised state institutions in order to 
override or contain centrifugal tendencies.  Or an accommodationist position, which argues 
for political and legal institutions that reflect and build upon the divisions of post-war 
societies, though power sharing arrangements involving the devolution of power or a federal 
system.1 There are nuances within this second position, about the powers that should be 
devolved, or the type of federal system to be adopted – for example Horowitz’s well known 
distinction between federalism which ‘draws through’ ethnic boundaries versus that which 
‘draws around’ and encircles major ethnic groups.2 Also important -- in the Sri Lanka case 
especially -- is the question of whether there should be asymmetric decentralisation or 
‘special autonomy’ as a conflict resolution mechanism.  
This article aims to go beyond what are often presented as largely technical questions of 
constitutional design, to explore how processes of post war state reform and decentralisation 
create new arenas of contestation, onto which competing international and domestic political 
narratives can be projected. This more complex reading of decentralisation processes is 
supported by existing case study research and other papers in this special issue. Four key 
points stand out in relation to Sri Lankan case. 
First, the democratising and peacebuilding potential of decentralisation efforts are shaped and 
constrained by local elites and patronage networks.3 Whilst post-war political settlements and 
elite pacts may undermine democracy, they may in fact be stabilizing if they lead to new, and 
sufficiently inclusive rent-sharing agreements.4 Second, decentralisation efforts often produce 
unforeseen and unintended effects. They may fail to achieve their ostensible goals because 
they run counter to the interests of central state and peripheral elites, but they may also lead 
to new forms of political mobilisation and claim making. Third, the stated goals of 
decentralisation efforts frequently cloak competing sets of ambitions and interests. One key 
tension is between deconcentration and devolution, the former referring to administrative 
decentralisation and the latter to political decentralisation5. In Sri Lanka this has boiled down 
to whether decentralisation becomes a vehicle to extend the power and penetration of the 
central state, or conversely it is seen as a means to provide political voice and autonomy to 
under-represented or excluded minorities – whether through devolved power within a unitary 
state, or more radically through a federal system. Fourth, decentralisation schemes have 
important discursive and symbolic value. They may be strategically framed by the state or 
international donors to signal commitment to peace, or to discredit ‘uncooperative’ and 
unruly local actors. As explored below, decentralisation may be presented as a conflict 
resolution mechanism, whilst in fact supporting a process of one-sided state consolidation. 
Analytically, decentralisation policies are often premised on what Ferguson and Gupta have 
called a ‘vertical topography of power’, the erroneous assumption that the state floats in a 
relatively abstract form above society, thus exaggerating its spatial reach and vertical height.6 
It also suffers from methodological nationalism; this tendency to treat states as natural 
entities, part of the normative order of things, is to fall into the ‘territorial trap’.7 This 
reification of the state is based upon simplistic binaries between state and non-state, public 
and private, national and local. Political economists, anthropologists and geographers 
question the notion of the state as a fixed object or as a finished product. They usefully de-
construct and denaturalise the idea of the state as a coherent and rational entity, seeing it as 
something that is always in the making, blurring binary distinctions and highlighting the 
networks, coalitions and material foundations that underpin or undermine the state.8 A 
growing focus on institutional hybridity or ‘twilight institutions’9 explores how political 
authority is built from below through complex amalgams of state and non-state institutions, 
practices and actors. 
Analyses of local government tend to focus on scale, but strangely neglect space – strange 
because local government is explicitly a technology of spatial ordering. We believe that the 
political dynamics surrounding local government institutions located at the centre such as 
municipal councils in Colombo are likely to be very different to those facing local 
government institutions at the margins of the state. Therefore, there is a need for a more 
nuanced examination of local governance that exposes the complex political topography of 
the state and the uneven processes of rule and development that unfold within and across the 
territory of the state.10 We seek to do this by bringing together an analysis of space, scale and 
networks.11 By doing so we work with ideas related to the politics and the meanings of place 
and the importance of boundaries which delimit and divide space and territory. Drawing on 
Lefebvre, tThis means exploring how spaces are ‘perceived, conceived and lived’; how place-
making and boundary drawing are simultaneously linked to governance processes at the 
global, national and local levels; and how flows of resources and ideas, mediated through 
networks and brokers, tie together these different scales and spaces.12 
Our analysis draws upon a literature that has focused on questions to do with space and 
power and the role that the state’s margins play in negotiating and constituting power at the 
centre.13 These marginal zones are neither ‘governance vacuums’ nor disconnected from 
circuits of capital and power at the national and transnational levels, but they have unique 
features in terms of how they are related to the putative centres of authority and capital 
accumulation.  
Some peripheries are conceived of as frontier regions: fuzzy zones of transition between 
different centres and registers of power, which are represented as ‘empty spaces’ that need to 
be pacified and incorporated into the civilizing project of the state.14 State expansion and 
market penetration are associated with the closure of frontier spaces, whilst extended conflict 
and the retreat of the state may be associated with the re-opening of frontiers. Frontier 
dynamics – and associated notions of centre and periphery – are liable to shift during wartime 
and post-war transitions. Power is spatialized in complex ways and states seek to govern the 
margins by transcending old boundaries and creating new ones. Conversely non-state 
authorities may seek to draw different boundaries, linked to enduring linguistic, ethnic or 
religious identities. Therefore local government boundaries intersect with and overlay a 
complex cartography of power and identity.  
The margins of the state are typically sites of institutional plurality and patchiness, and as a 
result actors located at the political or economic centre will often rely on intermediaries or 
brokers to mobilise political support or to access markets and capital in these peripheral 
zones. Such brokers may constitute simultaneously the connective tissue and point of friction 
between centre and periphery. As Eric Wolf notes, they ‘stand guard over the critical 
junctures or synapses of relationships which connect the local system to the larger whole’.15 
They are often powerful yet vulnerable figures who shape how power is imposed and 
resisted, and struggle to survive by ‘maintaining the tensions which provide the dynamic of 
their actions’.16  
Post-war transitions can be understood as moments of rupture or ‘revelatory crises’ when 
‘opportunities and risks multiply, when the scope of outcomes widens, and when new 
structural scaffolding is erected.’ 17 Brokerage, in such situations, is likely to be rearranged 
along new lines of authority, alongside continuities with former alliance-building strategies. 
18 The location and functions of brokers during these moments of rupture varies. Some, such 
as the example of Abdullah explored below, can be viewed as ‘embedded brokers’, deeply 
rooted in peripheral communities who perform a gatekeeping role. Others, such as the case of 
Punchinalame, are ‘representative brokers’, whose capacity to broker is founded on their 
strong ties to the central state.19  And some, such as Pillayan, may start off as the former and 
then end up as the latter, as they increasingly get pulled into the orbit of the central state. 
Brokers, then, occupy a complex and fluid political landscape – they may successively or 
simultaneously be mediators of coercive, political or economic resources, and their position 
in relation to the central state can oscillate between ‘exit’, ‘voice’ and ‘loyalty’.20 The 
outcomes of brokers’ activities are characteristically ambiguous. They can both facilitate the 
extension of the central state’s political or economic claims on the margins (as shown through 
the cases of Pillayan and Punchinalame), whilst also providing a focal point for the 
periphery’s claims on the state (as in the case of Abdullah).  
The relationship between the central state and the periphery is typically transformed by war. 
The margins of the state often serve as incubators of grievance and are central to the 
dynamics of war and peace. The edges of the state may become critical sites of institutional 
and socioeconomic innovation with new forms of political authority and new sources of 
capital accumulation and investment emerging from the periphery.21 In post-war contexts, 
troublesome frontier regions are often zones subjected to projects of stabilisation and 
pacification by the centre and become key sites of contestation between competing visions of 
development, peace and security. Development processes in these regions may be presented 
as pacifying, but they often involve highly coercive processes of primitive accumulation 
including land grabs, asset stripping and illicit/illegal economic activities. These frontier 
zones may also be sites of experimentation in which the central state trials new forms of 
policing, surveillance and militarized development, which are then redeployed at the centre in 
order to consolidate social control and centralise power. 
 
3. Towards a new political settlement? Sri Lanka’s Provincial Council System 
The label ‘local government’ is a complex and contested term in the Sri Lankan context. 
Generally, local government, or ‘local authorities’ (LA), refers exclusively to the lowest tier 
of government, i.e. Municipal Councils, Urban Councils and village-level Pradeshiya 
Sabhas. While these local government bodies play a role in day-to-day welfare of the 
population, they have not assumed any significance with regard to Sri Lanka’s major political 
contestation around the reform of the state. The opposite is true for the Provincial Councils, 
as explored below. 
Figure 1, below, shows the dualistic system of deconcentrated government, which takes the 
form of secretariats at the district and town level that are agents of the central state, coupled 
with weak devolved government in the form of the PCs and LA. Both tiers are involved in 
services and planning, which increases opportunities for corruption, political conflict, and 
wasteful duplication in service delivery.  
Figure 1:  Overview of administrative layers 
 
An extensive treatment of the history of statebuilding and the post-colonial Sri Lankan state 
is not possible here.22 For the purpose of our argument, two points must be made. Firstly, a 
key spatial division in Sri Lanka centres on three ecological zones: 1) the paddy producing, 
lowland, wet zone, 2) the cooler “upcountry” known for its plantations, and 3) and the 
Northeastern dry zone frontier. The large and scrubby buffer zone that separated the coastal 
settlements in the northeast from the rest of the country was inhabited by communities 
practicing shifting cultivation, which were more mobile and remained less legible to the 
state.23 The Northeastern frontier became central to the discursive and material reproduction 
of the post-colonial state, performing a range of functions; a zone of demographic expansion 
for the land poor peasantry in the wet zone; a civilizational frontier occupied by the Tamil 
‘other’ which helped promote a sense of nationhood amongst the Sinhala majority; a zone of 
accumulation as a result of investment in settlement projects which brought ‘barren’ lands 
under cultivation.  
Secondly, these frontier dynamics fuelled the Tamil separatist agenda. In the 1980s, 
contentious politics escalated into full-blown war and this heightened the intensity of, and 
contradictions between these centripetal and centrifugal forces. On the one hand the war in 
the northeast created a process of de facto decentralisation, with the opening of the frontier 
regions, as new forms of insurgent governance limited the reach and authority of the central 
state.24 At the same time, in response to the conflict the state became more militarized and 
more centralised, with greater power flowing to the executive due to the state of emergency. 
It is in this context that the Provincial Council (PC) system was introduced. The councils 
were established as a result of the Indo-Lanka Accord of 1987. The Accord, the product of 
strong Indian pressure, was an attempt to resolve the conflict through power sharing 
arrangements.. India’s ‘solution’, the PC system, was seen as a compromise: it preserved the 
unitary state, stopping well short of federalism, whilst providing the minority communities 
with a level of regional autonomy. 
The PCs were widely viewed as externally imposed and were never fully embraced by any of 
the major political parties in Sri Lanka.25 Although the Indo-Lanka Accord fulfilled one of 
the key demands of the Tamil groups -- the (temporary) merger of the Northern and Eastern 
Provinces into a single administrative unit – it fell well short of their maximalist position of a 
separate state, and the LTTE reneged on the agreement soon after.26 The Indo-Lankan accord 
was backed up by a large military intervention – the Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF) – 
which became embroiled in the conflict and ended up withdrawing. In the end, India’sAn ill-
fated military intervention by India was followed by renewed and intensified warfare. The 
Provincial Council system, though it had few domestic supporters, endured. 
The evolution of the Provincial Council System demonstrates a recurrent tension between the 
goals of a Sinhala-dominated central state that sought to undermine devolution through 
administrative, legal and political means, and a Tamil polity that has sought to challenge the 
centralising thrust of the state both by shaping the character of these new institutions (for 
example, applying pressure for a merged North Eastern PC) and by establishing de-facto 
control over territory in the North and East.  
The Provincial Council system was superimposed on top of this complex socio-political 
terrain. And in the process it spatialized power in particular ways, creating a political 
geography that privileged certain levels, and certain administrative/electoral delineations over 
others.29 Firstly, the PC can be understood as a conscious intervention in the scalar politics of 
the conflict. Earlier government decentralisation schemes bypassed the provincial level and 
focused on the district level;30 the reason for this was that it enabled the centrally controlled 
distribution of development resources at the grass roots, whilst undercutting Tamil efforts at 
wider ethno-linguistic mobilisation. However, the Tamil polity, demanded what was 
essentially a federalist institutional set up involving asymmetrical devolution and that 
recognized a Tamil Homeland (a spatial imaginary which saw the north and east as a 
contiguous block of Tamil speakers).31 In fact both positions were based on simplifications 
which sought to elide the complex social geography of the margins. The outcome was a 
deeply compromised one: a system based on provinces, ie a middle ground between the 
Northeastern region and districts, but this was then subjected to a second compromise 
through the provisional merger of the Northern and Eastern Province. This resulted in an 
administrative entity covering the whole Northeast (effectively matching “Tamil Eelam”), as 
a temporary deviation from a system that was explicitly premised on provinces.  
Secondly, the power and autonomy of the PCs was deliberately curtailed as the centre 
retained control over provincial finances, whilst administrative oversight was ensured 
through a governor appointed by the president. Key policy fields like control over land, 
finance and law enforcement were placed on a so-called concurrent list: they were supposed 
to be jointly managed by centre and province, but effectively remained under control of the 
former. The final wording of the Provincial Council Act left more powers in the hands of the 
centre, particularly those relating to raising revenues and the calling of elections.32 The 
powers of the PCs were further constrained by the highly centralised structure of the civil 
service, a conservative judiciary which tended to side with the centre, and with the 
entrenched nationalist ideology of the unitary state, which was deeply-rooted in the 
bureaucracy.33  
Thirdly, the PCs became a powerful symbol of India’s heavy-handed intervention, which 
further delegitimized them in the eyes of both Sinhala and Tamil nationalists. The LTTE 
explicitly disowned the PC system and branded those operating in it as traitors. It boycotted 
the first elections of the merged North-Eastern PC in 1988.34 With the Indian withdrawal in 
1990, much of the East fell under LTTE control apart from urban enclaves along the 
coastline, including Batticaloa and Muslim-populated towns.  
 
4. Wartime and post-war decentralisation politics in the East 
The empirical part of this article focuses on the dynamics of decentralised politics in Eastern 
Sri Lanka during the last years of the war and the subsequent post-war transition. We first 
look at the institutional architecture and politics that surrounded the Eastern Provincial 
Council. We then explore the manoeuvring of three contrasting brokers to show how the 
struggles around decentralisation are channelled not only through the visible, formal 
structures of the EPC, but also through informal networks that may work in parallel to, or at 
odds with it. 
The institutional politics of the EPC   
During the war in the 1990s, the state’s face in the region was largely a military one. The 
merged NEPC had no elected politicians; the minimal role that it had was played by the 
governor and civil servants. The war radically opened the entire northeast frontier, which 
became a zone of political experimentation. The LTTE established de facto state structures, 
and the outreach of the Sri Lankan state was heavily circumscribed by the war: older 
institutional forms like the civil service and electoral politics continued but under the shadow 
of new authorities and military rule.36 The East was the most volatile area throughout the war. 
It was the site of the breakdown of major ceasefires in 1990 and 2006. The war opened up the 
frontier regions, leadingled to a complex political geography, divided into ‘cleared’ 
(government controlled) and ‘uncleared’ (LTTE controlled) areas. Violence and insecurity 
led to the unmixing of populations and a complex mosaic of Tamil, Muslim and Sinhalese 
settlements along the East coast.37  
This political landscape was transformed after the 2002 ceasefire, which re-calibrated centre 
periphery and intra-periphery relations. Initially, at the national level, this translated into an 
historic convergence of the government’s and LTTE’s positions, manifest in the 2002 ‘Oslo 
declaration’ in which both sides agreed to explore a political solution based upon a federal 
structure. However peace talks soon broke down, leading to a volatile period of no war-no 
peace. A wide range of actors jockeyed for position, as new spaces for decentralised politics 
and nationalist contestation opened up and others closed. Old alliances and loyalties came 
under pressure, new networks and forms of collaboration emerged. One manifestation of 
these shifts was the LTTE split and the tilting of the strategic balance in the government’s 
favour, which contributed to resumed war in 2006 and then cumulated in the LTTE’s defeat, 
first in the East (2007) and then finally in the north (2009). 
It was in the east where these changes first manifested themselves and in hindsight, it was the 
Eastern margins (rather than the North) that played the constitutive role in ending the war and 
shaping the post-war political settlement. It was here that the splinter group of the LTTE, the 
so-called Karuna faction, emerged, which weakened the LTTE militarily and crucially 
undermined its claim to be the sole representative of the Tamils. The political party that 
emerged out of this faction, Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP) started talking about 
‘South Eelam’ rather than Tamil Eelam – breaking the unity of the imaginary state into two 
pieces. As Sánchez Meertens points out: ‘Once loyalties stopped being arranged around the 
imagined homeland, they started to be increasingly configured around personalities rather 
than purposes’.38  
It is also in this period that the Provincial Councils were brought back into play. The merging 
of the Northern and Eastern Council – a compromise to the Eelamists when the system was 
created – was ruled unconstitutional in 2006. This resulted in the de-merging of the NEPC 
into a separate EPC and NPC, a change with major spatial and electoral significance: not only 
did it prevent the convergence of decentralised government with the claimed Tamil homeland 
in the Northeast (ie the NEPC), it also improved government chances of ruling the periphery 
by proxy. With the strong Tamil majority in the North, the government had no hope of 
controlling the NPC, but the multi-ethnic Eastern province would be much more vulnerable 
to divide-and-rule tactics. Moreover, the East was conquered first, thus creating a political 
testing ground for post-war decentralisation politics. 
After defeating the LTTE in the East, the government was able to exploit ambiguities in 
mainstream narratives about decentralisation and conflict by conflating two distinct agendas: 
a peacebuilding narrative which focused on how the PCs support peace by providing 
autonomy and self-rule, and a statebuilding narrative that PCs could support a process of 
stabilization, state expansion and state consolidation in the Eastern Province, which had 
previously been partly under the control of the LTTE. This was operationalized through the 
‘Nagenahira Navodaya’ or Eastern Reawakening programme which included a range of 
construction efforts, typically accompanied by a big sign displaying president Rajapaksa and 
representative brokers like Pillayan or Punchinilame (see below). 
While these peacebuilding and statebuilding narratives held some appeal to international 
actors, the central state clearly prioritised the latter, and paid lip service to the former in an 
attempt to deflect criticism from western donors. Rajapaksa used elections in the East and the 
North to forestall and deflect international criticism of the government, particularly in 
response to impending United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) deadlines. As well 
as minimising criticism, this strategy of holding elections in the East in 2008 led to a 
softening of the position of donors such as USAID, the ADB and the Government of Japan, 
who had previously been cautious about providing development aid.39 Both the NPC and 
EPC thus had important symbolic value and provided an entry point for international 
engagement and investment from donors and the diaspora. Holding the Eastern Provincial 
Council elections in 2008 signalled the transition from military occupation towards an 
inclusive ‘tri-national’ political settlement, which had the backing of local populations and 
was supportive of local development needs. The EPC also provided opportunities for the 
central government to buy-in local powerholders and to legitimise their alliances with allies 
like the TMVP.  
Therefore the PC system served a variety of interests: it provided international players and 
particularly India, with a useful mechanism for demonstrating tangible progress in addressing 
conflict-related issues to the Indian public. The PCs also offered space for local actors 
including paramilitary groups such as the TMVP to consolidate or navigate their way through 
a shifting political landscape, for example by making a transition from military to political 
actors. 
 Political brokerage through and alongside the EPC 
 
Political brokerage does not only evolve within the official decentralised architecture, but 
typically establishes connections and affinities that escape these institutional logics. Most 
brokers derive some of their authority from their linkages with a particular institution, but 
their powers extend beyond these formal arenas. Other studies of religious brokers and civil 
servants in Eastern Sri Lanka have highlighted that, while the political space carved out by 
some brokers may contract during war time, it often expands for others.40  
 
 
Pillayan: from rebel to political chief 
 
As described in Sánchez Meertens detailed account, Pillayan’s unlikely rise to power started 
with a boundary crossing, literally and metaphorically -- in 1991 he crossed the Valaichenai 
River, venturing into the ‘uncleared’ area of Vaharai to join the LTTE. He was an unlikely 
recruit; he was physically small and, unlike his classmates, had kept a distance from militant 
groups until then.41 In contrast to Karuna, the man he was to later displace, he had a relatively 
lowly position in the political wing of Batticaloa. Even by the time of the 2004 split with the 
LTTE, there were five higher-ranking members between him and Karuna.42 Yet, he somehow 
managed to leap frog over them and usurp the leader in 2007– according to Sánchez 
Meertens (2013) because of control over information, participation in resource distribution 
and external contacts.  
 
However, iIn many respects, his career gets swept along by wider events. After the de-merging merger of the 
northern and Eastern Province and the ousting the LTTE from the East, the first ever 
elections of the EPC were are held in 2008. The Rajapaksa government seeks to consolidate its 
military success and manages to secure a majority by promising leaders from all three ethnic 
groups the Chief Minister position. Much to the dismay of the Muslim electorate, it finally 
offers the post to Pillayan, who sweeps the Tamil vote on a shared ticket with the Rajapaksa 
government (a victory enabled by the Tamil National Aliance party boycoting the pols). His rival Karuna is subsequently given a Ministerial post in Colombo. As Chief Minister, Pilayan plays a symbolicaly significant role, but achieves 
little. His popularity dwindles and the subsequent provincial elections of 2012 result in a 
landslide defeat. He is replaced by a Muslim politician and promoted into irrelevance as a 
presidential advisor. Pillayan’s fall from grace is confirmed when the Rajapaksa government 
is defeated in presidential and then parliamentary elections in 2015, thus removing his source 
of funding and protection. In October that year, he is arrested on allegations of a murder 
committed during the bloodletting associated with the first split. 
 
Pillayan’s utility as a broker was very context specific and time bound.43 The Rajapaksa 
government first deployed the TMVP as violent frontiersmen of the state, which involved 
franchising out ‘violence rights’ in the context of an open and unruly frontier. Then, in the 
aftermath of its military success, Pillayan represented a more malleable broker than Karuna, 
but could at the same time provide a gloss of democratic legitimacy to the EPC. 
He was thus absorbed into government through a key position, but cut off from major 
political resources: the legislative power of the EPC was deeply constrained and the bulk of 
government largess was channelled outside the Council, through characters like 
Punchinilame (below). Pillayan was finally discarded when his utility expired. His rise and 
fall were thus driven by a constellation of forces well beyond his control. 
 
However, his ability to survive this sequence of events, demonstrates remarkable agility, and 
a large portion of luck. After all, most of his fellow cadres did not make it through this 
turbulent transition with any success. Many were killed, either in the wake of the Karuna split 
or in the final phase of the war. Those who survived were forcibly demobilised, humiliated 
and indoctrinated. Many of those who tried to play different sides were assassinated. Pillayan 
not only managed to survive, he assumed leadership of the TMVP and converted its coercive 
resources into political and economic power as the boundaries of legitimate political action 
changed. He staged an electoral campaign and managed to hold out for four years in a deeply 
unstable political landscape. 
 
Remarkably, many of the people we interviewed when he was Chief Minister, were 
somewhat understanding of his predicament. Some felt that the problem was not him, but 
rather the conditions under which he worked. While Pillayan was in office, the central 
government effected a range of interventions that caused concern among Tamils and Muslims 
alike. There was deep anxiety about post-war militarisation of public life, land-grabbing 
under the guise of Buddhist sites, military camps or development projects and shifting ethnic 
demography through the arrival of Sinhala farmers and gerrymandering. “Pillayan makes 
statements about the plight of the Tamil people,” a Tamil church leader told us. “He sees 
what is happening in the East. But he can’t oppose this openly.… If he walks away from the 
President, he is a lost cause. Pillayan’s security is vulnerable. He can’t do much, but he will 
hold on.”  
 
The same informants were often less forgiving about Karuna. During the 2010 parliamentary 
elections, one of our Muslim respondents explained: “Karuna makes these absurd statements. 
Saying that fighting for our rights has failed, we must now focus on development. Like that, 
he is talking. The Tamils will not vote for him. They are a military group. Tamils are fed up 
with militaries.” It was obvious that Pillayan also had a militant background – no one would 
have forgotten about the TMVP’s ability to instil terror through intimidation, forced 
recruitment, killings and “white van kidnappings” or its violent electioneering. And yet, 
informants tended to direct their anger towards the government rather than Pillayan; a Tamil 
civil servant lamenting the policy of importing more Sinhala civil servants into EPC 
institutions told us: “The Governor and [central ministries] are doing this. Even though 
Pillayan is the Chief Minister, he has no power.” One of his colleagues addedtold us: “The 
problem lies with the non-implementation of the 13th Amendment.” Powers over police, land, 
finance and education should have been devolved to the EPC, “but for those things no 
authority was granted to the provinces. It is not about the Chief Minister. Whoever becomes 
the Chief Minister, no one can do anything. Pillayan is very good with the Eastern people, but 
he can’t do much. He is a good man.”  
 
Evidently, this apparent sympathy did not translate into electoral success. Pillayan’s victory 
at the 2008 polls emerged out of a peculiar constellation of adversaries – Pillayan along with 
a range of established Muslim and Sinhala strongmen – competing for votes under a 
government umbrella, with virtually no credible opposition candidates. The main Tamil party 
– the Tamil National Alliance (TNA), closely associated with the LTTE at the time – 
boycotted the polls. Tamil voters could essentially choose between staying at home, or 
flagging their Tamil identity by voting for the TMVP.44 This was different when the TNA 
joined the race during the elections of 2010 (Parliament) and 2012 (EPC). In both cases, the 
TMVP was wiped out except in a few small pockets of Batticaloa District. Pillayan had tried 
to nurture a political community primarily based on a regional Eastern Tamil identity. His 
statements were more conciliatory than those of the TNA, and the iconography of the TMVP 
replaced rifles and bullets with rice, sunrays, handshakes as well as religious (Christian and 
Hindu) references.45 He sought to gain a foothold in a post-war Tamil political arena, where 
an exclusivist ethno-separatist front had started to dissolve as intra-Tamil politics around 
divisions of class, caste, region and religion rose to the fore. Ultimately,but his political 
project ultimately failed to gain much traction. The more militant repertoire of the TNA 
prevailed.  
 
Pillayan’s experience illustrates how the fortunes of frontier brokers can fluctuate rapidly in 
post-war environments, as they seek to exploit opportunities provided by the changing 
dynamics on the ground, and as the goals of the political centre shift. The TMVP performed a 
short-term function for the regime of stabilising the region and helping to legitimise their 
rule, but these benefits diminished as the Rajapaksa government’s military and political 
control over the region was consolidated. This opened up the opportunity for new forms of 
brokerage, which brings us to our next case, Punchinilame.  
 
Punchinilame: from small town politician to viceroy  
 
Local roots are a key source of political capital for elected leaders in Eastern Sri Lanka. 
Almost all politicians, from local councils all the way up to parliament rely on an ethnic bloc 
vote from their home constituency – sometimes complemented by the community of their 
spouse. Town-based politicians that move up the chain are the ones who manage to tie 
themselves to other localities as well as voters from other ethnic backgrounds, often through 
the deployment of state resources. In light of this, Susantha Punchinilame is a highly unusual 
politician in Eastern Sri Lanka. As a Sinhala United National Party (UNP) leader from 
Ratnapura (in the South -West) with a rather chequered history he appeared an unlikely 
candidate to mobilise voters in the ethnicised political landscape of the Eastern Province. 
Nonetheless he became one of the region’s primary political leaders and like Pillayan, the 
combination of brokering skills and his political utility for the government, helps account for 
his rise. 
 
When Punchinilame was parachuted into the East, few people had heard of him and those 
who had remembered that he was suspected of murdering a rival politician in Ratnapura.46 
“He has a bad character,” a council member of the EPC told us. Having switched party and 
region, Punchinilame became the minister responsible for the Eastern Province under the 
Nation-Building Ministry, the primary patronage distribution network, headed by Basil 
Rajapaksa (the president’s brother). If the EPC was originally conceived as an attempt at 
pacifying the periphery by giving a limited voice to communities in the East, the Nation-
Building Ministry can be understood as an attempt to curb the secessionist impulse through 
top down economic development. Although the inner workings of the ministry were opaque, 
everybody knew this was where political power was concentrated and resources flowed. And 
soon, pretty much everybody in the East knew Punchinilame was the man to go to. His name 
was not difficult to remember: in Sinhala it translates as “little sir” in Sinhala, a name 
thatwhich seemed to naturally suit the small man with a moustache who acted like a viceroy 
under the tutelage of the ruling Rajapaksa family. 
 
Punchinilame was known to drive around the remote corners of the Eastern Province with his 
impressive motorcade of 4-wheel drives and police escorts to fix people’s problems on the 
spot. A senior Muslim community leader from Ampara District observed that, “Punchinilame 
was familiarizing himself with the region and he came to visit me. When he left he said: ‘Oh 
your road is not in good shape. You need a nicer one.’ And in seven days — seven days! — 
we had a tarmac road. After all those years of asking our own politicians at the Pradeshiya 
Sabha! He is a politician. […] He is one of those who needs development to survive.” 
Punchinilame performed miracles with a flick of his finger or a quick chat on his cell phone. 
“People were unhappy with the OIC [the Officer in Charge, the local head of police and a 
very powerful figure],” a Muslim community leader from Trincomalee District added. “They 
hated him and told Punchinilame. He replaced him on the spot.”47 His political potency was 
also linked to thuggery, intimidation, and cunning manoeuvres. Another interviewee from a 
poor rural village in the East noted that, “ if we don’t vote for him, he may give us trouble”. 
During election rallies that we attended, his entourage included some very large muscular 
men with fancy sunglasses, who claimed experience with the French foreign legion in Africa, 
foreign military training, as well as senior positions in the Sri Lankan police. 
 
His political powers were shown to full effect during the first parliamentary elections after 
the war, in 2010. As an “imported politician” running in a district (Trincomalee) where all his 
contenders had a clear home advantage, many thought he would not be able to mobilise 
sufficient electoral power. Moreover, the elections were seen as an opportunity to 
demonstrate the unpopularity of the government among Tamil and Muslim voters. But within 
a few weeks of campaigning, the contours of Punchinilame’s victory were starting to emerge. 
Organisers from rival parties or candidates gave in to the pressure and joined him. 
Underserved Tamil and Muslim constituencies, who were disappointed by the relative 
impotence of their own leaders, swayed. Many thought there was little point opposing the 
government and from that perspective forging ties with the Punchinilame, who had a direct 
line to Basil Rajapaksa, seemed like the smartest thing to do. After all, no politician could 
really be trusted, but Punchinilame was at least hard working, politically skilled, and 
provided the most credible access to government patronage. A retired civil servant from 
Punchinilame’s home district Ratnapura with prior experience in Trincomalee told us: “He [Punchinilame] is very shrewd. He talks like ‘machang’ [a slang word meaning 
‘mate’]. He is a man of close contacts. The people in Trincomalee are experiencing a new 
kind of politics. Susantha is not a good politician, but he knows his art.” 
 
After his victory in the 2010 elections in Trincomalee Punchinilame continued to be a major 
force there in the years to follow. He provides a fascinating parallel to Pillayan. Both have 
violent pasts, and both emerge as brokers in moments of rupture during the post war period. 
Pilliyan is Tamil and local; Punchinilame Sinhala and imported. Pillayan managed to muster 
a level of sympathy, but little political potency; the reverse was true for Punchinilame. Both 
these political figures thrived because they provided a form of brokerage that was politically 
expedient for the government; arguably Punchinilame was attractive because of his capacity 
for political mobilisation, whilst one of Pillayan’s main assets was precisely his limited 
powers and room for manoeuvre.  Both fulfilled a central role in the Rajapaksa 
administration’s drive to rule the east following the removal the LTTE. They enabled the 
government to manage post-war democratic forces with tokenistic forms of representation 
and ample flows of largesse. Pillayan’s role was to act as a figurehead and to prevent the 
provincial council from taking an overly activist stance – in other words he served to 
moderate centrifugal forces and in this sense he laid the ground for Punchinilame, whose role 
was to strengthen centripetal forces, by forging direct political and economic ties between the 
regime and constituencies in the east. Despite the contrast between them, both brokers end up 
backing a post-war agenda that involved muting bottom-up grievances about government 
policy (Pillayan) and amplifying top-down efforts of building a support base around 
resources rather than ideology or ethnic aspiration (Punchinilame). 
 
Abdullah: local leader, chameleon and survivor  
 The contradictions between the centripetal and centrifugal political forces manifests itself in 
tangible ways for those engaged in politics in Eastern Sri Lanka. This becomes very clear 
when we look at political leaders who represent their people in the provincial or local council, 
but whose constituencies are too insignificant to scale up. Particularly in the Muslim 
community this leads to some irreconcilable tensions. People expect their leaders to voice 
their concerns and make claims on the state, but at the same time, leaders need to be able to 
access to the government’s political machinery so as to ensure a flow of resources and 
services to their constituency. This leads to a rather schizophrenic politics of trying to act 
against the same forces one is making overtures to. This requires a kind of brokerage that 
does not simply straddle difference, but grapples with wholly oppositional forces – or to draw 
on Hirschman, they have to exercise ‘voice’ and ‘loyalty’ at the same time. 
 
The case of a local council leader in one of Eastern Sri Lanka’ Muslim pockets, a man we 
will call Abdullah, is illustrative of this challenge. Abdullah’s political career was marked by 
this need to jockey for position. He had survived as a supporter of the main Muslim party 
(SLMC), while running for either mainstream party (UNP, SLFP) and forging ties with key 
politicians of pretty much all colours. Throughout this history of changing sides, several 
factions had sought to gain access to his constituency, either by making him promises, or by 
intimidating him with subtle threats, or fabricated police charges.  
 
According to Abdullah, after the defeat of the LTTE, most people in his town were deeply 
dissatisfied with the Rajapaksa government. Apart from the corruption, family nepotism and 
the rising cost of living, they were particularly worried about land. A Buddhist monk had 
arrived to lay claims on large swaths of paddy land for sacred sites and the military was 
cordoning off land for security reasons. When Abdullah was chairman of the local council 
(Pradeshiya Sabha), he was forced to sign the paperwork endorsing some of the land deals. 
People higher up told him “this goes above you, you have to sign”. Particularly for leaders 
who sided with the opposition, it was difficult to resist such pressure. “In the opposition, we 
can’t oppose the government,” Abdullah explained. “If they go against us and we are in the 
government, maybe we can do something.” Moreover, he added, “if you are with the 
government, they will reward you. The Nation Building Ministry, for example, will bypass 
all and fund the Pradeshiya Sabha directly.” We talked about the challenges of siding with a 
government that one is trying to resist. We asked him: “doesn’t it trouble you to work with 
the very people who threaten you?” Do you trust them?” Abdullah replied: “We have to 
manage.” The crucial thing is for the people to stand together. “We must all unite, or we will 
lose. We must all unite behind me. I have tactics and cunning.”   
 
When we visited him a few years later, Abdullah had aligned himself with Punchinilame to 
preserve a foothold in government networks, but his constituency was raising increasingly 
vocal alarm about post-war land tussles. More Muslim farmers had been evicted by the 
military and the tussles over designated sacred land were coming to a head. People were 
trying to get their voices heard, Abdullah explained, but the EPC could not do much for them. 
In fact, one of Pillayan’s relatives was affected by one of the land struggles in Abdullah’s 
constituency, but even the Chief Minister could not stop it. With local elections going on in 
the neighbouring district, Abdullah found himself reluctantly campaigning for the 
government on one side of the border, while leading a protest against land grabbing practice 
of that same government in his own town. During the protest, he and his fellow Muslim 
leaders had been arrested and then released on bail. The ensuing court case would 
momentarily stall the contested land claims, but also left them vulnerable to government 
pressure. 
 
In the following week, Abdullah invited us to his house to hear all about this. Sat in a circle 
of his reception room we listened to the a sequence of testimonies dominated by the post-war 
grievances of the local Muslim community. Another local politician briefed us about the 
different sites that were being taken. The ulama leader explained about the increasingly anti-
Muslim sentiment that the government was fuelling; Muslim protesters needed to avoid 
violent escalation at all cost, because they would be branded as terrorists, and this could 
unleash Sinhala mobs. And several Muslim farmers told us in some detail about their 
eviction. One of them had started sleeping at his relative’s house out of fear of the military. 
When he came back one morning, the barbed wire of the military camp had been moved: it 
now included his plot. Therefore the subject of discussion was dominated by the post-war 
grievances of the local Muslim community. 
 
And then, just as they were discussing whether to appeal to senior Muslim politicians 
elsewhere in the country, there was a remarkable shift. From the front yard, one of the boys 
hanging around the house came rushing in whispering in an alarmed voice “minister, 
minister, minister”. What followed was the political version of a fire drill.. Before we realised 
what was happening, tThe entire group made its way into the private quarters and out the 
back door. The domestic worker came by the tables to collect all the teacups, the glasses and 
the snacks; he lifted the tablecloth to shake the crumbs off and replaced it. In the meantime, 
Abdullah moved out the front door to welcome his unexpected guest Susantha Punchinilame, 
and when he came in, all he saw were the foreign guests having a cup of tea. What happened 
in that half minute was like the quick closing of the curtain between two scenes with a 
different cast and a different dialogue. Exit disgruntled Muslims, enter the government 
‘Viceroy’, with Abdullah (and his foreign guests) as the point of continuity.   
 
A polite conversational game of chess followed, with carefully fielded questions and friendly, 
but somewhat evasive answers. Development efforts after the war had indeed made 
significant progress. A hint at the minister’s impressive political career elicited some false 
modesty about his role. Many people had come to like him, because he really worked for the 
people. He was in direct contact with Basil Rajapaksa who had empowered him to reach 
down to every village with the necessary support. And yes, there were some unfortunate 
contentions around land. These were highly complex matters for which a solution would have 
to be found. Sri Lanka after all was an ancient country (a subtle reference to the glorious 
history of the Sinhala civilisation) and the sentiments of the majority needed to be reckoned 
with, but surely there was a way to resolve these issues amicably and reach a compromise. 
What he meant by compromise was clearly not some sort of power sharing between the 
central government and the EPC on crucial issues like land and law enforcement. Rather it 
would involve promoting the vision of Mahinda Rajapaksa, thus leaving behind ethnic 
antagonisms and pursuing harmonious development. Why could Sinhala farmers not come to 
this region, just like Tamils and Muslims could move to Colombo? Abdullah just nodded 
silently.  
 
Brokers and boundaries in transition 
 
The varied forms of brokerage exhibited in these three cases are summarised in Table 1, 
which outlines five key ways in which these figures differ – in terms of their origins, source 
of power, constituency, role, and trajectory: 
 Table 1:  
Pillayan  
‘The Frontier broker’ 
Punchinilame  
‘The Power broker’ 
Abdullah  
The ‘Go-between’ 
Origins 
LTTE cadre from 
Batticaloa 
 
 
Southern UNP politician 
from Ratnapura 
 
Local councillor in a small 
town in the East  
Source of power 
Stage 1:  
Pre-2008: Access to armed 
cadres and intelligence; 
representative of Eastern 
Tamils; diaspora linkages 
Post-2008: Official 
position; government 
patronage 
 
 
Proximity to top-level 
politicians, mainly Basil 
Rajapaksa 
State patronage/resources 
and political muscle 
 
Point of access to, and 
representative of Muslims 
in his constituency 
Constituency   
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Eastern Tamils, but with 
shallow roots 
No pre-existing 
constituency in the East 
Muslims in his town and 
surrounding villages 
Role 
Stage 1:  militarily weaken 
and de-legitimize the 
LTTE 
Stage 2: deliver a Tamil 
vote block; legitimize the 
government takeover of 
the East 
 
 
Extend and strengthen 
patronage networks; 
funnel resources, 
discipline and corral 
opposition 
 
Voice concerns of Eastern 
Muslim, to make claims on 
the state and act as a 
transmission mechanism 
or point of access for 
political parties in the East 
Trajectory 
‘Exit’ (as an LTTE rebel), 
followed by ‘voice’ 
(mobilizing a Tamil 
political voice through the 
TMVP), then ‘loyalty’ 
(period of emasculation as 
Chief Minister), followed 
by fall from grace (end of 
backing from the centre 
with fall of SLFP) 
 
‘Loyalty’ (brought in as 
the government’s viceroy 
in the east); fall of regime 
leading to a decline in 
influence 
 
Simultaneously exercising 
‘voice’ and ‘loyalty’ -- 
maintaining position in 
spite of ups and downs 
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The first two brokers – Pillayan and Punchinilame – were among the most powerful players 
in the East during the period studied. The third one – Abdullah – is a less influential town-
based politician. The arena in which they operate is heavily shaped by the post-war moment. . 
In an attempt to convert its military success into firm political control over the region, the 
central government sought to bring key leaders and vote blocks into its orbit. However, 
building a firm and loyal base among the fractured electorate with roughly equal proportions 
of Tamil, Muslim and Sinhala voters was no easy task.  
 
The case of Abdullah illustrates how these contradictions are replicated further down the 
political food chain. 
 
By 2016, there was a new coalition government in power, with Maithripala Siresena from the 
SLFP as President and Ranil Wickermasinghe from the UNP as Prime Minister. The two key 
election promises were ‘Good good governance’ (‘yahapalayanaya’) and state reform by 
getting rid of the executive presidency and devolving powers to the provinces were two key 
election promises. As for our three brokers, Pillayan had been arrested, Punchinilame was 
hanging on, and Abdullah was still there, struggling with the everyday contradictions of 
being a Muslim leader in Eastern Sri Lanka.  
 
 
5. Conclusions 
Accounts of post-war transitions and peacebuilding that only focus on the formal institutions 
miss a great deal about how these structures are embedded within the political marketplace 
and wider society. We have argued that processes of decentralisation produce new arenas of 
conflict and that to understand these, we need to pay close attention to the interplay between 
formal institutional structures and the individual brokers that weave in and out of them. The 
EPC became a key arena for pursuing and reconciling post-war struggles between contending 
political forces at the centre and periphery, but these dynamics were heavily mediated by 
brokers like Pillayan, Punchinalame and Abdullah. These characters operated in a particular 
constellation of constraint and opportunity; the dynamics of state expansion and 
consolidation described here are specific to the frontier, and are marked by contests over the 
re-drawing and transgression of boundaries. The Rajapaksa government’s attempt to re-
activate the Provincial Council system after the war represents one highly visible attempt to 
re-fashion political boundaries and territorialise power. But frontier brokers were also deeply 
involved in these processes, which can be discerned in the TMVP’s nascent attempts to 
sketch a new political community for Eastern Tamils, or in Abdullah’s fraught attempts to 
straddle and reconcile the competing demands placed on him by agents of the state like 
Punchinilame and his core Muslim constituency.  
In explaining the manoeuvring of these brokers, we may distinguish elements of Hirschman’s 
exit, voice and loyalty.48 Exit, in the form of fighting for a separate state, and then 
subsequently leaving the movement (Pillayan); Voice in relation to Abdullah’s struggles to 
get his constituencies’ grievances heard. But also Pillayan’s unsuccessful attempt to create a 
platform for an Eastern Tamil political community (a career trajectory that moved from exit, 
to voice and then loyalty). And finally Punchinilame most clearly exemplifies loyalty as one 
of the Rajapaksa’s trusted agents in the East. Pillayan’s loyalty to that government always 
remained unstable. And for Abdullah it is clear that loyalty must always be plural, contingent 
and transient to grapple with the contradictions of his political project. 
These career paths raise questions about the autonomy and agency of frontier brokers – 
whether they simply follow the scripts set for them by more powerful players and wider 
structural forces, or whether they have a degree of ‘context freedom’ – in other words is this a 
story of path dependency or path shaping?. Evidently, the case of Eastern Sri Lankaour study 
suggests that this is very time dependent – during moments of rupture, or when frontiers are 
re-opening, brokers appear to have much great autonomy, than when frontiers are closing and 
they are being incorporated into central state structures. Few would argue that either of these 
three characters deserves more than a footnote in Sri Lanka’s history of statebuilding and 
civil war. And yet, they each played a role both in supporting the Rajapaksa government’s 
plans for the East and in negotiating their outcomes. The case could be advanced that the 
Eastern margins played a constitutive role in ending the war and shaping the post-war 
political settlement and served as . This takes us back to our earlier point about the state’s 
margins being crucialimportant zones of experimentation and incubators of change.  
Each of our three brokers have rather idiosyncratic career trajectories, but at the same time 
their biographies are intertwined with, and in a small way helped shape wider events related 
to changing frontier dynamics, the demise of the LTTE and reconfiguration of the political 
constellation in the vacuum they left behind. This frontier story of oscillating power and 
opening and closing frontiers might be told – at the risk of overly simplifying a complex 
narrative – in five chapters.  
During the first chapter (the relative equilibrium prior to the 2002 ceasefire) the Northeastern 
frontier became a zone of non-state or anti state administrative experimentation. At this time, 
the provincial council was a frozen entity trumped by various forms of military governance. 
Pillayan is a junior cadre, Punchinilame a small town Sinhala politician in the South, and 
Abdullah jockeyed for position between the various competing political forces. The second 
chapter (destabilisation following the ceasefire) saw the emergence of the TMVP, which 
fatally wounded the LTTE. And paradoxically the re-scaling of the Tamil national imaginary 
– from Tamil nationalism, to localism – opened up the periphery to the forces of centralism 
and Sinhala nationalism. The split enabled firstly the state to regain and strengthen its 
foothold in the east, a process also supported by the de-merging on the EPC and NPC. The 
East became a laboratory, or zone of experimentation for rolling out a programme of 
securitized development and controlled democratisation. Brokers like Punchinilame were 
brought in as viceroys to secure political turf for the government. The latter was less about 
local government than local governance – brokers were critical nodes in rhizomic networks 
that underpinned or subverted the formal façade of the EPC. This does not mean the EPC was 
irrelevant; it was necessary to get important constituencies (international, Tamil and Muslim) 
on board, but its primary value was symbolic.  
The third chapter was precipitated by the defeat of the LTTE – which the TMVP aided 
through their intelligence and deployment of cadres in the North. This chapter witnessed the 
rolling out of what had been field tested in the East, leading to the partial but still contested 
closure of the Northern frontier. Punchinilame entrenches his position in the East, whilst 
while Pillayan’s lease of political life is running out. Unable to mobilize a solid vote bank, his 
utility to the government declines and he is replaced by a Muslim broker loyal to the 
government. In many respects, Abdullah, as a small-town politician, constitutes a point of 
continuity that persists throughout the transition; changing all the time, but keeping things 
relatively the same. Abdullah had to manoeuvre carefully when the LTTE ruled the areas 
around his town and repositioned himself when either of Sri Lanka’s mainstream parties 
replaced the other. It is these chameleon-like qualities that enabled him to stay in the game. 
This reminds us that decentralisation and institutional reform may not produce the imagined 
results. After all, there are many small-town brokers like Abdullah, who occupy the synapses 
between centre and periphery and are simultaneously the connective tissue and point of 
friction within the system. Although Abdullah was Janus-faced, ultimately he sided with his 
community when their land was being taken, even though this jeopardised his career as a 
broker.  
In the fourth chapter, the margins started to ‘invade’ the centre, in the sense that modes of 
governing and disciplinary powers -- through a state of exception – that were deployed in the 
North and East, were increasingly applied to the body politic in the South – including 
growing surveillance of the population, arrests and intimidation of civil society, the removal 
of checks on executive power.49 This suggests that the margins offer a unique perspective on 
the state, not because they are exotic, but because the margins represent ‘a necessary 
curtailment of the state, much as the exception is a necessary component of the rule’.50 Of 
course there is now a fifth chapter, which is being played out at the time of writing. Arguably 
it was the modes of frontier governance that were transferred and applied at the centre that 
generated the grievances in the Sinhala polity that led to the regime’s crisis of legitimacy and 
its final fall from power. A more inclusive political settlement in which power is more 
dispersed and negotiated has opened up the space for dialogue on constitutional reform and 
perhaps a renegotiation of centre periphery relations. And perhaps, for the first time in its 
history, the EPC may emerge as a genuine political platform for articulating the region’s 
grievances or experimenting with Muslim-Tamil cooperation. The story ends less well for our 
two power-brokers. Pillayan is in prison, whilst Punchinilame’s role as a de facto viceroy 
declined significantly. Abdullah though remains in the game, as these wider events sweep 
over him. None of these three brokers can claim a central role in this bigger story, but they 
were certainly unwitting players and their life histories deserve to be studied more closely. 
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